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STANDARDIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN 
ACTOR-NETWORK PERSPECTIVE 
Gao, Ping, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM), University of 
Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9QH, UK 
Abstract   
Present information systems studies focus on technology from developed countries. Little is known 
about the standardization of indigenous technology in the developing world. Drawing upon actor-
network theory, this paper investigates China’s experience of developing and deploying wireless 
local-area network (WLAN) standards. We demonstrate that counter-network is a useful concept to 
analyze the mechanism of actor-network formulation. We argue that developing countries should set 
up a R&D management system that supports the principle of tech-neutralism  





Technology standardization is the critical research frontier for information Systems (King and 
Lyytinen, 2004). But existing literature focuses primarily on technology from developed countries 
(Walsham, 2001), and little is known about the development and implementation of indigenous 
technology in the developing world. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating China’s 
experience of developing and deploying wireless local-area network (WLAN) standards.  
The principal WLAN standards in use are the IEEE 802.11 series, so called Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity). 
Because a wireless network broadcasts messages using radio, it is particularly susceptible to 
eavesdropping. Hence, security is a challenge in the standardization of WLAN products. The security 
flaw has been a major concern for users, especially business users, to adopt the Wi-Fi technology. 
Though IEEE has been making efforts to improve it, the progress is slower than that the market 
requires. Consequently, China has developed its own security scheme for WLAN called WAPI 
(WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure). While the technological advantage of WAPI has 
not been seriously challenged, its implementation method has received strong objections. As a result, 
WAPI has failed to be implemented. 
The analysis of China’s experience of standardizing WLAN products is important from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives. In contrast to current standard studies that treat standard 
development and implementation separately (Gerst et al, 2005), this paper analyzes China’s attempt to 
standardize indigenous WLAN technology in an integrated approach. We will identify what factors 
have shaped the process of WAPI development and implementation, and how. 
Our paper has theoretical as well as practical contributions. Our case study demonstrates actor-
network theory, especially its concept of counter-network, enables us to better understand the 
standardization process compared to the nationalism perspective currently being used (Braa et al, 
2004; Suttmeier, 2005).   
2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
2.1 Theoretical ground  
We aim to disclose the social interaction around the WAPI technology. The actor-network theory suits 
our initiative and hence we employ it as an analytical tool. One potential application of this theory is 
the investigation of the process whereby the respective interests of different human and non-human 
elements are aligned into a social and technological arrangement or artefact - in our case the WAPI 
standards and their implementation method (Walsham and Sahay, 1999).  
“Successful networks of aligned interests are created through the enrolment of a sufficient body of 
allies and the translation of their interests so that they are willing to participate in particular ways of 
thinking and acting that maintain the network” (Walsham and Sahay, 1999 , p.42). The actor-network 
theory examines the motivations and actions of human actors that align their interests around non-
human actors. “Inscription” and “translation” are key concepts for understanding the interest 
alignment to form an actor-network. The actors’ interests are flexible and can be translated, enabling 
the interest alignment and the maintenance of an actor-network (Monteiro and Hanseth, 1996). 
Politics exist in the process of interest alignment of competing agenda (Bowker and Star, 1999).  
Further, Castells (2000) gives us the notion of counter-network that describes how different actors set 
up contradictory networks (Braa et al, 2004). Our task is to disclose the process whereby actors 
struggle to dominate the network building, and finally form a common actor-network through interest 
translation by actors and the compromise of two counter-networks, which we hereby call defensive 
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Figure 1. Framework of actor-network analysis  
2.2 Method  
The actor-network theory requires researchers to examine the process of interest alignment to form a 
network (Monteiro and Hanseth, 1996). Accordingly, this paper presents a longitudinal case study 
(Holmes and Poole, 1991). Using the terminology of actor-network theory as the unifying lexicon of 
analysis, we first develop a process-oriented narrative of WAPI standardization in China. Through this 
narrative we reveal how events, activities and choices are ordered over time. According to critical 
events, the whole process is divided into three distinct phases. In the first phase, WAPI standards are 
published. The second phase is characterized by the fierce debate between the Chinese standard 
developers and international stakeholders in the WLAN market on the obligatory implementation of 
WAPI technology. In the third phase, China decides to indefinitely postpone the WAPI 
implementation. We then explain the WAPI standardization process by linking it with the 
technological, institutional and social contexts. 
The data were first collected from public sources, mainly the Internet. For the last two years China’s 
initiative to implement WAPI has been the focus of Chinese and foreign media, researchers, 
governments and information technology industry. We kept following the trend of WAPI 
standardization, and browsed the reports that viewed China’s WAPI issue from different perspectives, 
but specifically paid attention to official and authoritative data sources, like China Daily, People’s 
Daily, etc. The second-hand data gave us outlines of the process whereby China developed and 
implemented WAPI technology which, in turn, alerted us to the major technological, institutional and 
social factors driving this process. To improve the reliability of these accounts, we used other data 
sources to triangulate the evidence (Klein and Myers, 1999). We interviewed key players concerning 
WAPI standardization. During the phase of collecting second-hand data, we kept regular email and 
phone communications with these informants to seek answers to problems raised. Finally, towards the 
end of 2004, when we had a rough picture of the whole process of WAPI standardization, we 
undertook a field study in China to strengthen our understanding. We met people from the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII), China Communications Standard Association, Huawei as a Chinese 
vendor with an international reputation, and China Telecom, a network operator.  
3 THE CASE 
There were two counter actor-networks fighting to dominate the interest inscription on WAPI 
implementation. One could be called the defensive network, organized by MII to develop and protect 










confront implementing WAPI (Figure 1). The challenging network successfully enrolled the industrial 
giants, associations, and the US government. In contrast, the defensive network continued to be weak. 
As a result, WAPI failed to be implemented. 
3.1           June 2001 to October 2003: standard development and publication 
The incumbent Wi-Fi technology does not support good security mechanism to users and hence was 
destined to be eliminated from the market. In China, on the one hand, more and more Chinese 
individuals were ready to use wireless access to the Internet and the WLAN market was going to 
boom. On the other hand, the security flaw of Wi-Fi restricted the interests of enterprises, government 
branches, etc., in WLAN services. To protect more users being locked into this inferior technology 
and promote the growth of the collective user market, MII was interested in quickly deploying new 
WLAN standards with better security solutions.  Consequently, in June 2001, MII published a R&D 
plan of drafting national and industrial standards in wireless broadband fields, including two projects 
about WLAN standards. Two months later, MII set up the China Broadband Wireless Internet Protocol 
Standard Group (BWIPS) to undertake the R&D on WLAN standards
1
. BWIPS had 26 members: the 
China Electronic Standard Institute (CESI) and the National Radio Monitoring Centre under MII, the 
Research Center for Commercial Key of China affiliated to the Standard Administration of China 
(SAC), five state universities, and companies with close relations with MII. MII also appointed two 
liaison officials from its Division of Standardization to BWIPS.  
In the beginning of 2002, SAC issued Decree Number 41, which included the two projects undertaken 
by BWIPS in the issuing plan of national standards during 2002-2003. By the end of 2002, the first 
versions of the standards were finished. These standards adopt a new security solution called WAPI. 
Different from IEEE 802.11 technology, WAPI is a sort of elliptic-curve encryption with a block 
cipher (Bo, 2003).  
In January 2003, MII organized an evaluation of these two standards with 23 people from 12 
organizations affiliated to MII and SAC, etc., voting. The expert comments were: WAPI standards 
were based on advanced technologies; they were practical to combat the security flaws of current 
WLAN solutions; they met the specific requirement of domestic market, and the implementation 
method was feasible. Consequently, MII delivered an application to SAC for approving these two 
technological solutions as national standards. On May 12
th
, 2003, SAC published these two standards 
as national standards. The decree alleged that they were based on ISO/IEC9902.11 and 
ISO/IEC8802.11b, and their design considered the interconnection of WLAN products. 
On July 9
th
, 2003, a joint meeting was held to formally announce the publication of WAPI standards. 
Officials from eight authorities, including MII, SAC, Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
State Reform and Development Commission (SRDC), etc., participated. In the press conference, they 
introduced the technology advantage of the WAPI standards and outlined the market benefit they 
might have for the Chinese information industry. They pledged that since WAPI implementation 
concerned the national interests of security, they would continuously support it (Bo, 2003). This 
meeting did not stress how to implement the WAPI technology, which turned out to be the top concern 
of foreign actors in the WLAN market.  
3.2           November 2003: announcing the schedule of implementation 
On November 26
th
 and December 1
st
, 2003, SAC issued Decree Number 110, which announced that 
from June 1
st
, 2004, it was prohibited to produce, import and sell WLAN products that did not comply 
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with WAPI standards. As a result, China refused to adopt Wi-Fi that needed technological 
improvement for better information security (Pan and Fu, 2004).  
The corresponding problem with WAPI was that it was a proprietary protocol controlled by the 
Chinese government. According to the “Business Encryption Management Regulation” that was 
published as Decree Number 273 by the State Council in October 1999, the WAPI algorithm was a 
national secret and hence could only be authorized to specific Chinese companies. Eleven such 
Chinese companies, including Huawei and Lenovo, were designated by the government to have the 
algorithm. Foreign equipment vendors that wanted to sell WLAN products in China were required to 
license WAPI through a manufacturing agreement with one of these Chinese companies (Chen, 2003).  
To make matters worse, there was only a six-month grace period, until June 1
st
, to comply with the 
mandatory standards. This touched off strong reaction from foreign stakeholders.  
As Mannion and Clendenin (2003) described the situation: “Though China’s Wi-Fi standard has been 
nearly two years in the making, the WAPI encryption algorithm seems to have caught the industry by 
surprise.” Some manufacturers in Taiwan, including major players in international WLAN and the 
semiconductor market like BenQ and D-Link, expressed their willingness to endorse the WAPI 
standards and supply compatible equipment. In the US, wireless chip makers, Atheros, Cisco’s 
Lindsys, and Netgear said they would build the specifications into products designed for the Chinese 
market (Clendenin and Mannion, 2004; Zhu, 2004). Most companies like Hewlett-Packard and IBM 
took the stance of “wait and see” (Fang and Fang, 2004).  
These actors of defensive network were relatively weak players in the WLAN market. Their interests 
resided in benefiting from the possible market re-shuffle due to implementing new standards. In 
contrast, IEEE, Wi-Fi Alliance and its members like Broadcom and Intel dominated the WLAN 
market. To protect their vested interests, these industry giants initiated the challenging network to 
resist WAPI implementation. They first voiced their objection through the US Information 
Technology Office (USITO). Located in Beijing, USITO was a trade group to protect the interests of 
the US information industry in China. USITO concluded that whatever national-security argument 
China might give, the way of implementing WAPI involved national protectionism. Specifically, 
USITO warned the concerns that foreign products would be locked out of China’s WLAN market if 
they could not reach an agreement with a local partner. Since the Chinese firms, many of which 
competed with foreign vendors, were not under any obligation to license WAPI to their foreign 
counterparts, this was possible or they charged too high a fee for authentication (Zhu, 2003).  
IEEE was interested in maintaining its control on WLAN standards, for which it was working on the 
802.11i version, aiming to provide higher level security and to substitute Wi-Fi. On November 23
rd
, 
2003, Paul Nikolich, Chairman of the IEEE 802 Local and Metropolitan Area Network Standards 
Committee, wrote a letter to the SAC Chairman and MII Minister. He wrote: “We are concerned that 
mandatory use of the standard would prohibit the use of 802.11 standard products and thereby limit 
choice and increase costs of users.” He argued that the Chinese security standard for wireless networks 
could fracture Wi-Fi, the de facto WLAN standard, which meant its implementation could undermine 
efforts to develop a global standard for WLAN and drive up the cost of network equipment for end 
users. Nikolich acknowledged that 802.11 security should be improved, and offered to engage Chinese 
authorities on this subject. He promised that IEEE was open to the possibility of incorporating WAPI 
into 802.11i to avoid splitting the WLAN product markets into two
2
.  
The Chinese requirement to obligatorily implement WAPI was strongly against the interest of 
Broadcom, the largest WLAN chip producer in the world. As early as on January 27
th
, 2004, its CEO 
Alan Ross told Reuters (Sorid, 2004): “We are not playing their game. We are not going to lose our 
technological edge through the risky disclosure of our intellectual property. To the extent that the only 
way to enter the Chinese market is using their encryption scheme, we are not committed to doing that 
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today”. Soon on January 30
th
, 2004, Wi-Fi Alliance declared sharing interests with Broadcom and 
decided to reject WAPI. Its chairman, Dennis Eaton, criticized the WAPI standards as being only 
favourable to Chinese firms, as the encryption method was controlled by BWIPS composed of 
Chinese organizations. The WAPI implementation method forced foreign suppliers to produce their 
chips in China, which led to the concern that their confidential techniques might be leaked to the 
Chinese competitors. Dennis Eaton threatened that if compromise could not be reached, its members 
would stop shipping WLAN equipment to China after June 1
st
 (Liu, 2004).   
In February 2004, more powerful actors were enrolled into the challenging network. The heads of 
Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), Chamber of Commerce, Semiconductor Industry 
Association (SIA), National Association of Manufactures (NAM), and US-China Business Council 
(USCBC) met in Washington. These key US government and industry bodies made an effort to stifle 
WAPI that was believed to undermine the WTO’s trading efforts with China (ITI, 2004; SIA, 2004).  
This collective movement drew some congressmen to join in the challenging network. Representative 
Philip Crane and Charles Rangel, Senator Max Baucus, Craig Thomas and Gordon Smith urged 
government officials to be actively involved in this matter, and required the Chinese ambassador to the 
US to deal with this issue.  Some congressmen even sent a letter to President Bush and asked him to 
take the WAPI case to WTO (USITO, 2004). As a result, the challenging network was substantially 
intensified with the participation of three senior US officials. On March 3
rd
, Secretary of Commerce, 
Donald Evens, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and Trade Representative, Robert Zoelick wrote to 
two Vice Premier Ministers of China, Wu Yi and Zeng Peiyan, who respectively were in charge of 
international trade and high-tech policy. They pointed out that China’s move of implementing WAPI 
created a precedent for using standards as barriers to international trade. This letter turned out to bring 
significant diplomatic pressure on China to settle a compromise over the issue (Palmer, 2004).   
WAPI was a big concern for Intel, the “Number one monopoly” in the Chinese WLAN market (Fang 
and Fang, 2004). In spring 2002, Intel invested hundreds of millions of dollars to launch Centrino 
processors based on the Wi-Fi standard. Laptops with Centrino processors were becoming the most 
popular application for WLAN and profit was rolling in. But Intel’s interest in China’s WLAN market 
was substantial, far beyond the profits arising from Centrino. Hence Intel was cautious to say “No” to 
WAPI. It was on March 9
th
, 2004, when a strong challenging network had been established with the 
involvement of the US government, that the spokeswoman of Intel’s Beijing Branch announced “Intel 
is not able to reach an agreement with the Chinese companies authorized by the Chinese government 
nor is it possible to find out a practical way to guarantee the quality in the execution of cooperation.” 
Intel criticized that China developed this technology internally and refused to openly shared details 
with others. But Intel would not rule out eventually using WAPI, provided that China was open to 
making technical changes (Liu, 2004). Intel claimed that it made this decision after three months of 
studying the WAPI implementation rules and having active talks with the Chinese government, 
relevant institutions and firms on issues like techniques. While direct data were unavailable, it was 
believed that Intel decided to reject WAPI because the Chinese side had asked for a royalty that was 
too high for Intel to accept (Fordahal, 2004). 
The Chinese government kept silent. The defensive network seemed to have only BWIPS as the active 
actors. BWIPS’s spokesman alleged that it was a national sovereignty for a country to set up its own 
standard in its own market for the concern of security. BWIPS claimed that even without foreign 
cooperation, Chinese firms were able to manufacture their own WAPI compatible products (Zhu, 
2003). Some Chinese computer makers had submitted applications to China Qualification Center 
(CQC) to process certifications for their WAPI products (Liu, 2004). Founder, the 2
nd
 largest computer 
maker in China, reported the first success in developing A760 WAPI chips and access points. On April 
5
th
, 2004, CQC issued the certificate to Founder’s NB700 laptop that had an embedded A760 chip. 
But, by referring to an internal message, eNet reported that Founder’s access points were too 
expensive for normal customers to use (Anonymous, 2004). 
3.3          April 2004: postponing the implementation 
 
7 
The 15th plenary session of the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) took 
place on April 21, 2004 in the US. Established in 1983, JCCT was a government-to-government 
consultative mechanism that provided a forum to resolve trade concerns and promote bilateral 
commercial opportunities. This was a special session co-chaired by Secretary of Commerce, Donald 
Evans, and Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, on the US side and by Vice Premier Minister, Wu 
Yi, on the Chinese side. WAPI was one of the seven issues of this meeting. The JCCT achieved 
concrete results on key concerns. The US promised to ease restrictions on the export of some high-
tech US products to China, and would support China’s aspiration to seek “market economy status” in 
the WTO. In return, China would suspend indefinitely the proposed implementation of WAPI as 
mandatory standards, and revise WAPI standards to take into account comments from foreign firms 
and participate in international standardization bodies
3
. As a result, the Chinese government led the 
defensive network to concede to the challenging network. This move was necessary for the two 
governments to maintain a network in issues with substantial interests on both sides.  
4.          ANALYSIS:  WHY DID CHINA’S WAPI INITIATIVE FAIL? 
The Chinese developers and potential foreign adopters of WAPI technology conflicted on two issues. 
The first one concerned the co-existence of competitive standards. The Wi-Fi Alliance claimed IEEE 
802.11 had become the de facto industry standard, and WAPI was a deviation from the mainstream. 
The Chinese side criticized Wi-Fi for its serious security flaws which had hindered the WALN market 
development, and thus called for new standards. The question of a unique standard or competitive 
standards in the market is a traditional debate in standardization communities. Both have pros and 
cons. A unique standard supports the scale of economy, but it might lead to a monopoly and lock-in 
the customers to inferior technology. To have multiple standards, the users have to afford the cost of 
interconnection and interoperability. Hence, Wi-Fi Alliance could not simply require China to give up 
competitive standards. In fact, China could have stopped Wi-Fi with the excuse of its poor security 
mechanism, as some European countries did (Liu, 2004). China could also have protected itself with 
the security advantage of WAPI, which deserved sacrificing incompatibility.  
The problem was that WAPI did not support efficient compatibility with Wi-Fi, but China took it as 
obligatory standards and restricted using Wi-Fi technology. The WAPI implication method was 
unacceptable to foreigners, which was the second area of dispute. The WAPI encryption code was 
only granted to Chinese firms, and foreign companies were forced to cooperate with them to get into 
China’s WLAN market. While BWIPS insisted that China had the right to adopt its own standard in its 
own market in a way required by the relevant law, Intel et al. saw it as  discrimination and a 
contradiction to WTO law regarding national treatment. For China, the argument is that the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) stipulates that a country can take protective 
measures in the consideration of national security, which might give it the excuse to develop its own 
proprietary standards. Given that the US National Security Agency fiddled with the Data Encryption 
Standard to create encryption backdoors, why could China not control the code (Wirbel, 2004)?   
To the end, the WAPI dispute was an interest conflict. The counter-network compromise was a result 
of political negotiation and the trials of power. Intel successfully mobilized other vendors, industrial 
associations, congressmen, and the US government forming a strong challenging network, where 
different actors firmly stood together to boycott deploying WAPI. But BWIPS failed to set up a strong 
defensive network. Only BWIPS itself showed a solid interest in implementing WAPI by the schedule 
stipulated by relevant decrees. Further, it was in the national interest of China to back off the original 
plan of implementing WAPI in exchange for the support of the US in more important trade issues.  
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Intel adopted a pragmatic strategy in forming the challenging network. In the beginning when Intel 
still considered the possibility of cooperation, it exercised its voice of objection through USITO. Intel 
formally announced the rejection when the state officials participated in the challenging network, 
which meant that the WAPI issue became the concern of a normal trade relationship between two 
countries. The national interest of the US was involved in the WAPI issue; hence, the challenging 
network would not easily compromise. In contrast, BWIPS gave ambiguous, contradictory 
information on the compatibility and advantage of WAPI technology. Its only strategy was to protect 
itself by relating WAPI standards with sovereignty and national secrets. 
5.        DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We have observed that the strength of the actors’ interests, their specific positions in the market, and 
their political power determine the interest alignment and hence the standardization process. In the 
WAPI case, BWIPS members were the actors with direct interest to see WAPI obligatorily 
implemented since it meant intellectual property right (IPR) income to them. Under a centralized 
system of decision, the state had the final word on WAPI implementation. The state had to evaluate 
the impact of WAPI implementation on the international trade and economic development. It also 
needed to consider the interests of the consumers and operators. Hence, the decision of the state was 
for the national interests as a whole, instead of limiting them to the WAPI issue. The interests of 
incumbent foreign monopoly tended to be against WAPI that might challenge their established 
positions in the WLAN market. But they needed to be careful to say “No” to avoid losing the Chinese 
market. They also knew innovation was necessary due to the technological flaws in the security 
mechanisms of the existing standards.  So the interests of the incumbents could be translated under 
proper contexts. Different actors stood in each of the two counter-networks, which fought for 
dominance on whether or not to implement WAPI.  
In technology WAPI was immature. It did not support efficient compatibility to incumbent standards 
and its implementation would involve relatively higher costs. Hence, foreign competitors formed a 
challenging network to boycott the implementation of WAPI standards. However, China lacked a 
coherent institutional set-up to support BWIPS translating the interests of foreign manufacturers. 
Above all, the Chinese government would not enrol itself in the defensive network, and without such a 
powerful actor, the defensive network compromised to the challenging network and WAPI failed to be 
implemented. 
Our research results have theoretical implications for academia. In the literature, scholars explain the 
standardization process from multiple perspectives using technological diffusion, economic, social, 
and political theories (Gerst et al, 2005). On the other hand, actor-network theory mainly serves as a 
methodology of describing a process as network building. In this paper, we demonstrate that actor-
network is a proper tool for conducting standardization study (Hanseth and Monteiro, 1997). In using 
actor-network theory, researchers should take interest translation and inscription of actors, and 
compromise of counter-networks as key words (Braa et al, 2004).  
Our case study has practical implications for standardization practitioners, especially those in 
developing countries. For authorities responsible for standardization management, our analysis 
suggests that the standardization processes accommodate a considerable heterogeneity of interests 
(Suttmeier, 2005). For developing countries, foreign pacesetters set the architecture that they have to 
follow (Morris and Ferguson, 1993). Further, developing countries have a weak R&D capability. 
Cooperation between new technology developers in these countries and foreign owners of incumbent 
standards is extremely important to realize compatibility between new and incumbent standards, and 
ensure the advantage of new technology. 
The Chinese experience of implementing indigenous technology tells developing countries that the 
debate around implementing a standard is a matter of interests, and the balance point of interests is 
decided by actors in the counter-networks through their trial of power in market, technology and trade. 
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These countries should be aware of their weak bargaining positions, and know that techno-nationalism 
only works conditionally and market size advantage has limited power. In the case of WAPI, market 
could be a leverage to allure foreign manufacturers to adopt WAPI, but it had a limited role as WTO 
set the rules of the game. Though these rules could be disputed, compared with the US, China as a 
developing country was on the weak position in bargaining and more likely to compromise. We may 
get more implications from the case of Linux. In China, due to the government mandate, the Linux-
based operating system and office applications developed by Chinese software companies eroded 
Microsoft’s dominance in software procurement. This was possible as China did not commit to 
WTO’s item of government procurement (Cao, 2004).  
Developing countries should encourage forming cross-industry institutions and social networks, and 
use them to coordinate the interests of different actors in developing and implementing indigenous 
technologies. In developing countries, these institutions and networks are often poorly developed, and 
are sometimes neglected by policy-makers and technology developers (Chen and Ning, 2002).  
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